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STANDING ON ONE LEG: 
BALANCING COLLEGE STUDENTS’ FREE SPEECH 
WITH ARTICLE III REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
MARY J. GOERS* 
 
Cite as: Mary J. Goers, Standing on One Leg: Balancing College Students’ Free 
Speech With Article III Requirements in the Seventh Circuit, 15 SEVENTH CIRCUIT 





Intellectual inquiry and debate on college campuses have been a 
contested topics for much of American history. The freedom of the 
intellectual quest that college and university students benefit from 
encourages speech and debate from all areas of the political spectrum. 
For example, students these days on campus constantly engage in 
political speech and debate stemming from the current administration 
or the most recent decision and composition of the Supreme Court.1  
This has occurred for decades. A prime example of this was 
during the 1970s, when students protested the Vietnam War.2 Fast 
forward to today, students are engaging in controversial dialogue 
surrounding political views, which necessarily means that higher 
education institutions create a ripe environment for students to discuss 
 
* J.D. candidate, May 2021, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Julian E. Zelizer & Morton Keller, Is Free Speech Really Challenged on 
Campus?, The Atlantic, Sept. 15, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2017/09/students-free-speech-campus-protest/539673/. 
2 Lovgren, Fred, The Antiwar University, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1972. 
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issues.3 A larger debate around the extent of freedom of speech and 
what is permissible on a university’s property occasionally results in 
conflict among students and a school’s administration, with students 
claiming content-based regulation of speech and possibly filing a First 
Amendment complaint against their university. However, these 
student grievances have evolved into a question of whether a party has 
the appropriate standing to bring the lawsuit. In mid-2020, the Seventh 
Circuit held that a free speech organization could not bring a lawsuit 
against several University of Illinois administrators, finding that the 
university’s initiatives did not create an injury in fact necessary to 
support a viable First Amendment lawsuit. 
The University of Illinois, through its administrators, created 
several programs, policies, and protocols that addressed incidents of 
potentially biased or racist speech on the university campus by 
students.4 The programs and policies were intended to create a 
meaningful, hospitable platform for discussions involving bias, racism, 
and politically incorrect language.5 Yet, these policies left certain 
conservative students “chilled.”6 Speech First, Inc., when it filed its 
complaint as an association on behalf of University students, could not 
necessarily demonstrate how the students were “chilled,” as the 
university’s initiatives merely created a safe platform for addressing 
students who offended others through biased and racist speech to 
create and foster an environment of learning and understanding 
between its students, not stopping it altogether.7 Hidden within the 
discussion of free speech on college campuses lies a smaller, more 
complicated discussion of how student speech can somehow be chilled 
by university policies providing environments to create debate and 
free inquiry. 
 
3 Zelizer, supra. 
4 Speech First, Inc., v. Thomas L. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2020). 
5 Id. at 632-33. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 647 (affirming the Central District of Illinois’s finding that Speech First, 
Inc. did not sufficiently allege an injury in fact under the standing doctrine). 
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The Seventh Circuit also found that the free speech organization’s 
complaint was moot regarding a challenge to a portion of the student 
conduct code.8 The university eventually repealed the portion at issue, 
but the free speech organization decided to continue with litigation 
regarding this portion of the student code.9 The Seventh Circuit stated 
that through all stages of litigation, the case and controversy must be 
alive.10 A repealed student code section could not be revived simply 
for the Seventh Circuit to decide whether it, in the past, “chilled” 
student speech.11 However, Judge Brennan, offering a separate opinion 
that dissented from the majority’s holding about the case’s mootness, 
did believe that the petitioners brought a timely complaint about the 
student code section that required “prior approval” regarding student-
made, candidate-focused posters and other distributed materials for 
non-campus elections.12 Judge Brennan found it suspect, the timing of 
the repeal of the student code, as it happened approximately seven 
weeks into the beginning stages of litigation.13 
 
A CLOSE ANALYSIS OF STANDING AND MOOTNESS 
 
The standing doctrine aids courts in disposing cases or 
controversies which lack a valid cause of action, a constitutionally 
rooted requirement, by determining which party is the best suited to 
 
8 Id. at 646. 
9 Id. The University has never enforced this policy and repealed it through its 
formal amendment process, resulting in “a full vote by the Conference on Conduct 
Governance and approval by the chancellor.” Id. Speech First, Inc. recognizes that 
“this process is analogous to legislation” which would moot the issue. Id. The 
Seventh Circuit also found persuasive the sworn affidavit by the Associate Dean of 
Students Rhonda Kirts that the University has no intention of restoring the 
eliminated provision. Id. at 636, 646.  
10 Id. at 645. 
11 Id. at 646 (finding that the “policy is not a threat to students past, present, or 
future”). 
12 Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. at 653-54 (finding that the “relative ease, timing, and manner” the 
University used in abolishing the Student Code casts doubt on the permanency of the 
repeal).  
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bring the case.14 The standing doctrine has a long history, starting 
from its constitutional beginnings in Article III. Article III standing 
requires a complaining party to establish (1) an injury in fact, (2) that 
the challenged conduct caused the injury, and (3) some likelihood that 
a decision in his favor will remedy the injury.15  
The contents of the standing doctrine itself have a long history in 
American jurisprudence.16 The connection and link it has to free 
speech issues is also lengthy and varied.17 The standing doctrine has 
been developed through the years to demonstrate a petitioning party’s 
need to illustrate an injury in fact, which is the main issue in Speech 
First, Inc. v. Killeen, et al.18 A free speech organization and 
association attempted to speak on behalf of various students at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, but ultimately failed to 
demonstrate a “chilling effect” that various school policies had in 
deterring students from speaking freely.19  
 
HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE 
 
 The standing doctrine has a long history. It originated from the 
“case or controversy” section of Article III of the United States 
Constitution.20 In short, its tripartite scheme was formalized in 1978, 
where it resulted from 1970s jurisprudence that closed the gaps in 
Article III criteria.21 Prior to 1978, the standing doctrine’s criterion 
 
14 Heather Elliot, Article, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When 
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 Ind. L.J. 551, 
557 (2012); see also Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, Article, The Standing 
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 Nw. U.L.Rev. 169, 176 (2012). 
15 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (“SBA List”), 573 U.S. 149, 157-58 
(2014). 
16 Elliot, supra note 14, at 557. 
17 Howard, Celia A., Note, No Place For Speech Zones: How Colleges Engage 
in Expressive Gerrymandering, 35 Ga. St. U.L.Rev. 387, 408-09 (2019). 
18 Lee, supra note 14, at 171. 
19 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 638-39. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Elliot, supra note 14, at 557. 
21 Id. 
4
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were a more relaxed version of the strict and infamous tripartite test. 
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court explained that the standing 
doctrine analyzed if "the appellants [had] alleged such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court . . . depends.”22 The Court’s main policies in creating the 
standing doctrine formula and roadblock for would-be plaintiffs arises 
out of judicial economy.23 Additionally, the standing doctrine ensures 
that the separation of powers instilled by the Constitution’s structure 
of separate branches will be kept while also preventing political 
activity and legislative procedures out of court activity so that courts 
may keep doing their jobs.24 The courts main role is to interpret laws 
and provide clarity, not overreach into political decisions that lead 
courts to act in a legislative or executive capacity. 
Originally, the standing doctrine took the opposite effect of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Speech First, Inc., where it kept liberal 
plaintiffs out of court in the 1960s and 1970s.25 Those cases advocated 
for environmental and civil rights.26 But, a turning point in 
environmentalist cases where the Court found standing, signaled a 
change in shift to the current critical use or weaponization of the 
 
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). This less particularized approach to 
the doctrine resulted in a long line of cases determining each specific element of the 
tripartite test, resulting in a specific analysis to each element, leading to the current 
day doctrine. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) 
(discussing “injury in fact” as a nonconjectural or hypothesized “possible” harm, but 
one that has already occurred or is imminent) (internal citations omitted). It is also 
important to note that “[t]he Court has issued opinions dealing with a variety of 
special circumstances under the constitutional standing doctrine, to the text of the 
note including generalized grievances, to the text of the note procedural injury, to the 
text of the note informational injury, to the text of the note and risk of harm.” Elliot, 
supra note 14, at 556. The standing doctrine that currently exists in the 2010s is 
much more nuanced and stricter than the theorized version that appeared in Baker v. 
Carr. 369 U.S. at 204. 
23 Elliot, supra note 14, at 554. 
24 Id. at 557.  
25 Id. at 559. 
26 Id. 
5
Goers: Standing On One Leg: Balancing College Students' Free Speech with
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 16                                          Fall 2020 
 
6 
standing doctrine.27 The Court gently opened the narrowly construed 
standing doctrine in a few environmental instances, but held the 
standing doctrine’s formalist analysis close when it refused tax payers, 
and the like, the ability to sue simply because of their status as a 
taxpayer for civil rights issues, such as misappropriation of federal 
funds to private versus public schools and charitable tax exemptions 
for a hospital that did not serve the poor.28 The Court reasoned that in 
both of these instances, the injury in fact could not be sufficiently 
alleged for the taxpayer to be the best suited party for that specific 
issue.29 
Further, the 1960s gave birth to public interest litigation that 
severely threatened the constitutional separation of powers.30 
Therefore, “rather than supporting the conservative goal of keeping 
broad-based public interest litigation out of court, restrictive standing 
requirements may originally have achieved precisely the opposite 
result: preserving and enshrining the liberal New Deal administrative 
state.”31 Some scholars and academics believe the standing doctrine is 
 
27 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992). 
28 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (finding no standing for a 
taxpayer plaintiff since the alleged misappropriation of federal funds was a “mere 
stigmatic injury”); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 
U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976). The Supreme Court in Allen and Simon blocked the plaintiff 
taxpayers for appearing in federal court, as the injuries alleged could not be traced to 
their status as taxpayers, however the Court has also somewhat bent its formalist 
approach to environmental litigation instances, where the injury need not be an 
economic one, but one of aesthetic enjoyment, a departure from what normally 
qualified as a “particularized” injury. See Lee, supra note 14, at 178-79 (discussing 
current interpretation of “harm” under the standing doctrine, where economic or 
“wallet” harm are legally recognized injuries, whereas other harms, such as 
ideological harm, are not). 
29 Elliot, supra note 14, at 560.  
30 Id. (quoting Ho, Daniel E. & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the 
Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 
Stan. L. Rev. 591, 640-47 (2010) (suggesting rise of public interest litigation in the 
1960s as a reason for tightening of standing doctrine in the 1970s)). 
31 Id. It seems as though courts continually use the standing doctrine to oppose 
both sides of the political spectrum’s policy agendas in courts to prevent 
6
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used as a weaponized tool for liberal justices to preclude litigation 
which challenges progressive programs by various conservative 
activists and parties.32 However, that is not necessarily the case. While 
critics of the standing doctrine may claim that it ultimately stops a 
balanced inquiry of new programs and policies, it actually presupposes 
and correctly identifies how the balanced inquiry must be sought by 
maintaining separation between the branches of the federal 
government. 
Beginning in the 2000s, the standing doctrine had swung away 
from the 1960s dismissal of liberal-leaning court advocacy, now acting 
as a barrier and bar for conservative plaintiffs who challenged gay 
rights and defended the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.33 As the 
country’s politicization and divisiveness took a turn towards a 
prevalent liberal leaning, the Court enacted the standing doctrine to 
 
overreaching in to a legislative or rule-making spheres. From blocking liberal-
leaning environmental litigation in the 1960s and conservative-based free speech 
agenda in the 2010s, the standing doctrine allows courts to focus on judicial 
decision-making instead of unintentionally creating and shaping legislation. See, 
e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 
(1997)). The Supreme Court explained that the “standing inquiry has been especially 
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an 
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Governmental was 
unconstitutional,” id., and that “relaxation of standing requirements is directly 
related to the expansion of judicial power,” United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
32 Elliot, supra note 14, at 563. See, e.g., Glenn v. Holder, 738 F. Supp. 2d 718, 
731 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that pastors lacked standing to challenge the 
criminal provisions of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act, which added sexuality as a protected category); Morrison v. Bd. of 
Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a student opposed to 
homosexuality on religious grounds lacked standing to challenge school board's ban 
on making stigmatizing comments about other students' sexual orientation); 
Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 452 F. Supp. 2d 794, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(holding that plaintiffs who burned gay-pride flags to protest homosexuality lacked 
standing to seek injunctive relief against city); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs who preached against homosexuality on university 
campus lacked standing to challenge permit requirement imposed by university, 
when they had never even applied for the permit). 
33 Id. at 563-64. 
7
Goers: Standing On One Leg: Balancing College Students' Free Speech with
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 16                                          Fall 2020 
 
8 
allow a quiet, yet warranted tempering of conservative voices to 
appropriate volumes. By closing the door for certain conservative 
plaintiffs, the standing doctrine guards against frivolous or misplaced 
lawsuits regarding certain policies and programs that have been 
enacted most recently.34 Further, it encourages and helps to maintain 
the balance between the three branches of government and pushes 
judicial economy in federal courts.35  
For associations or certain groups of people that are disallowed 
from bringing a claim in federal court, the same rules for the standing 
doctrine apply. Associational standing must also sufficiently allege the 
same tripartite initial analysis that the Court has set out since its 
formalization in 1978.36 Associations must be able to allege standing 
so that political groups do not have the ability or power to attach 
themselves to pet issues or projects. A key idea here is that an 
association simply cannot be granted a wider breadth for standing 
because it represents a group.37 A number of plaintiffs alone do not 
allege an injury. The case analytics are fact-specific.  
Speech First, Inc. demonstrates the fact that, sometimes, the 
association or interest group has the correct motive and method for 
bringing a claim in federal court, and sometimes it does not. Speech 
First, Inc. has successfully litigated issues akin to the one in the 
Seventh Circuit in the past, just like other interest groups have done, 
yet in some instances, a mere allegation of wrongdoing or injury in 
fact is not sufficient enough for a court to allow the case to enter into 
its jurisdiction.38 Speech First, Inc., and similar groups may be able to 






36 United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 
U.S. 544, 552 (1996) (explaining the modern doctrine of associational standing, 
“under which an organization may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even without 
a showing of injury to the association itself, emerges from a trilogy of cases.”).  
37 Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). 
38 See Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019). 
8
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THE DOCTRINE OF MOOTNESS 
 
Mootness is attached to the standing doctrine, where it analyzes 
the appropriate timing of a case and the timing of a court’s 
redressability for the alleged injury.39 This doctrine is similar to the 
standing doctrine in that the Court tries to adhere to an efficient 
adversarial system, but it does not focus on the parties themselves, 
rather, it focuses on the timing of the case and controversy before a 
court.40 Mootness, under Article III’s case or controversy provision, 
“must exist not only [when] ‘the complaint is filed,’ but through ‘all 
stages’ of litigation.”41 Mootness also does not focus on the initial 
appearance of the case; it focuses on the potential case for the entire 
existence of the litigation process.42 The Court has described the 
doctrine of mootness as “standing set in a time frame,” and the 
controversy must remain “live” for the entire cycle of litigation, 
otherwise, there would be no standing.43 In being similar but distinct 
from the standing doctrine, this creates another barrier that plaintiffs 
must avoid in order for a court to hear their case.  
Mootness requires that a case be dismissed whenever a 
circumstance would eliminate an element of a case or controversy.44 
The consequences and high stakes of mootness requires a 
comprehensive structure, necessary to glean and create viable issues 
for a court to determine when and where a plaintiff may find redress 
for a sufficient harm. For an appeal, the case cannot be moot. 
Therefore, “the law of mootness recognizes that an appeal represents 
the continuation of a single case or controversy, not the initiation of a 
 
39 Scott, Ryan W., ARTICLE: CIRCUMVENTING STANDING TO APPEAL, 
72 Fla. L. Rev. 741, 773 (Jul. 2020) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 




43 Id. (quoting Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91). 
44 Id. at 774. 
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new one.”45 Again, this principle takes into consideration the fact that 
a case’s life cycle must demonstrate standing throughout. It is not as 
though an injury can be renewed in time for an appeal because an 
appeal is a continuation, not a standalone, new case on the same issue. 
Second, the doctrine of mootness also “recognizes that the parties’ 
own actions can render a controversy moot.”46 It is in these instances 
that a case may end because parties choose to resolve the dispute in a 
manner that is separate from a court’s eyes and actions. For example, 
parties settling a case or a plaintiff’s withdrawal from the complaint 
would render a case or controversy moot due to a party’s own 
actions.47  
While the doctrine of mootness might seem as though it is just 
another brick wall or barrier in a potential plaintiff’s way, the doctrine 
carries more flexibility than the standing doctrine. The Supreme Court 
acknowledged and explained two exceptions to the doctrine of 
mootness. First, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation” of challenged 
conduct would not render a case moot without a strong demonstration 
that the conduct “cannot reasonably be expected to recur.”48 This 
protects against a defendant agreeing to alter its actions with no 
guarantee that it would not regress to its original ways.49 Second, a 
case or controversy may seem as though it is moot, yet cases that are 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” may be heard by a court 
because the plaintiff has a reasonable chance of being injured in the 
same way again.50 Therefore, this aids in resolving conflict that may 
not be fully resolved since it is bound to recur in the future.  
The court system in the United States, because of the absolute bar 
it sets with the standing doctrine, allows more flexibility in granting 
standing through an exception to the doctrine of mootness. While a 
court may find that a case is moot, and therefore, it lacks standing, this 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 775. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 775-76. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 777. 
10
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more malleable review and standard that a court may apply creates 
adaptability to hear and assist in certain cases or controversies.  
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MOST RECENT STANDING ISSUE – 
SPEECH FIRST, INC. V. KILLEEN, ET. AL. 
 
The Seventh Circuit grappled with analyzing standing in the form 
of free speech on college campuses and in American higher education. 
Free speech on college campuses is a hot button issue across the 
country, with issues pertaining to free intellectual inquiry and a self-
proclaimed dearth in the ability to speak freely in higher education.  
Free speech on college campuses across the country create 
opportunities for students to freely express their individual thoughts. 
However, universities are developing programs for students to find 
common ground and understanding through dialogue that discourages 
biased and prejudiced speaking.51 At the University of Illinois, the 
administration created a comprehensive platform for students to use to 
accomplish these goals.52 A free speech group, Speech First, sued 
twenty-nine administrators at the University on behalf of four 
anonymous students, claiming First Amendment violations since the 
university’s program “chilled free speech” and harmed students who 
wished to express more conservative, traditional views.53 The Seventh 
Circuit, in Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, found that Speech First had no 
standing to bring a First Amendment complaint, as there was no injury 
in fact or “chilling effect” from University policies, nor were there 
signs of administrative coercion or punishment towards students who 
 
51 Howard, supra note 17, at 402 (stating that “[i]n the past few years, there 
has been a firestorm of speakers and opinion pieces lashing out against school 
speech policies, and tensions appear to be escalating on campus.”). See also, 
Kashana Cauley, When Conservatives Suppress Campus Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/opinion/conservatives-campus-
speech-wisconsin.html; Elliot C. McLaughlin, War on Campus, CNN (May 1, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/campus-free-speech-trnd/index.html. 
52 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 632.  
53 Id. 
11
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believe these conservative views.54 The Seventh Circuit’s holding that 
found no case or controversy existed for Speech First against the 
University of Illinois demonstrates that while the First Amendment is 
an assumed right for every person in the United States, a First 
Amendment complaint is not. 
In Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
standing doctrine and mootness for freedom of speech on college 
campuses. It almost seems as though it was the perfect time for the 
Seventh Circuit to analyze such an issue when a self-proclaimed crisis 
has started across the country and supposedly chilling free speech on 
college campuses.55 In fact, with President Trump’s executive order in 
March 2019, the free speech crisis on college campuses seemed as 
though it was a legitimate issue at the forefront of the executive 
administration. The executive order, titled “Improving Free Inquiry, 
Transparency, and Accountability at Colleges and Universities,” 
demonstrated the executive administration’s desire to preserve speech 
of all kinds on college campuses.56 The “free inquiry” component of 
the executive order sought to promote “free and open debate on 
college and university campuses.”57 Except, the free and open campus 
environment for debates and thorough inquiry acts as a prerequisite to 
receive federal funding, which bring in itself another wholly debatable 
issue of coercively conditioning a University’s policy in order to 
receive federal monies.  
Maybe it is not the fact that some students believe that higher 
education institutions are continually attempting to “chill” some sort 
of conservative, right-wing policies and speech, but it is the disbelief 
that higher institutions should instill policies that create a safe and 
open environment for this “free inquiry” that the Trump 
 
54 Id. at 647. 
55 Bollinger, Lee C., Free Speech on Campus is Doing Just Fine, Thank You, 
The Atlantic (June 12, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ 
free-speech-crisis-campus-isnt-real/591394/. 
56 Executive Order No. 13864, 84 Fed. Reg. 58, 11401 (Mar. 26, 2019).  
57 Id.  
12
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Administration desires.58 The administrators at the University of 
Illinois, which brought about the newest First Amendment issue on a 
college campus, wanted to promote free inquiry of its students and 
engage in meaningful debate and discussion. However, the 
administrators also knew that leaving students to their own devices in 
order to do so created a potentially hostile environment for this 
debate.59 The administrators wanted to promote fairness in free 
inquiry, which some students found to be “chilling.”60 
The Seventh Circuit did not weigh the merits of the claimed First 
Amendment violations that Speech First, Inc. complained about on 
behalf of a few University students who were members of its group.61 
The Seventh Circuit expounded upon and carefully explained the need 
for control and separation of the courts from legislative and executive 
bodies by analyzing whether Speech First was the appropriate party 
for the case. In asking for a preliminary injunction to cease the three 
University policies it alleged violated the First Amendment, Speech 
First argued that students were forced to “engage in self-censorship” 
and that the policies “deter[red] them from speaking openly about 




The policies themselves that University of Illinois adopted do 
nothing more than create a meaningful, safe platform for students to 
express their concerns about other students’ views that are potentially 
harmful and detrimental to students. The Bias Assessment Response 
Team and the Bias Incident Protocol are just two of the contested 
university policies that Speech First, Inc. challenged in its latest 
crusade. 
 
58 Bollinger, supra. 
59 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 635-36 (recounting statistics of the impact of 
policies among students in calming biased and racist incidents on campus). 
60 Id. at 633. 
61 Id. at 632. 
62 Id.  
13
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The Bias Assessment Response Team (BART) and the Bias 
Incident Protocol (BIP) are programs that the University of Illinois 
administration uses to address concerns of students who demonstrate 
views that are discriminatory, racist, or otherwise harmful in some 
nature.63 Any member of the student body may report an incident of 
biased or discriminatory speech with BART, that is attached to the 
Office for Student Conflict Resolution.64 After reporting through an 
anonymous webform, it is dumped into an internal database.65 From 
there, BART members discuss the database reports in bi-weekly 
meetings to determine whether it is necessary to reach out to all 
students involved in the incident.66 If a BART meeting does happen, 
BART cannot require students to change their behavior nor does it 
have the authority to issues sanctions if the student chooses not to do 
so.67 In addition, there is no formal sanction or punishment of any kind 
if a student is reported to BART.68  
BIP is a separate, but identical, program and policy to BART that 
operates for university houses and does not come with campus-wide 
jurisdiction. BIP addresses bias-motivated incidents in residence halls 
at the university and within university housing.69 Again, there are no 
sanctions or foreseeable punishment that a student would encounter 
for either being reported to BIP through its anonymous webform.70 
Speech First, Inc. admitted that neither it nor its members had any 
firsthand knowledge of BART or BIP; it relied on students’ 
 
63 Id. “Bias-motivated incidents” are “actions, or expressions that are 
motivated, at least in party, by prejudice against or hostility toward a person (or 
group) because of the person’s (or group’s) actual or perceived age, disability/ability 
status, ethnicity, gender, gender identity/expression, national origin, race, 
religion/spirituality, sexual orientation, socioeconomic class, etc,” according to 
BART standards. Id. at 632-33. 
64 Id. at 633. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 633-34. 
67 Id. at 634-35. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
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communications about these policies in filing suit.71 The president of 
Speech First, Inc. only asserted that the identity of the student who 
committed the bias-motivated incident may be used in the future to 
target students.72 Yet, the University challenged this argument, as 
BART and BIP conversations are entirely voluntary and actions and 
sanctions against the student do not occur solely because of the 
anonymous complaint that would be filed in the webform.73  
While BART and BIP do not have any formalized punishment, 
policy, or consequence attached to a finding of biased-motivated 
speech, BART does publish an annual report of incidents with 
generalized data, removing any identifying markers of students 
involved.74 BART and BIP incidents may also be connected to 
instances of behavior that coincide with a violation of the University’s 
Student Code, such as physical violence, sexual harassment, or 
stalking, but BART incidents themselves are not handled through the 
University’s formalized disciplinary system.75 Yet, these University 
Student Code violations that are initially reported through the BART 
and BIP systems are not referred to the University’s formal 
 
71 Id. at 634. 
72 Id. Notably, Speech First’s National President, Nicole Neily, reported that 
one student advisor told a BART-reported student “‘that he could see from the 
student’s files that the student had met with someone from the BART.’” Id. But, the 
Seventh Circuit did not expand further on this point in its decision, as “Neily 
provide[d] no other detail about BART and its operations.” Id. While a BART report 
could be seen on a student’s records, the Seventh Circuit still found that there were 
still no particularized injuries coinciding with this issue. Id. at 643-44. 
73 Id. at 634. 
74 Id. at 633. The Seventh Circuit’s decision lists three examples of BART 
incidents published in its annual report, including removal of chalked phrases, such 
as “Women are Worthless” and “Go White Privilege.” Id. at 633-34. Other instances 
of face-to-face student speech reported to BART include a student telling another 
that he voted for Trump to deport another student and a posting on Facebook about 
an “Affirmative Action Bake Sale” where students would be charged different prices 
for the food based on race and ethnicity. Id. The Annual Report noted that chalked 
saying were removed within an hour of being reported to BART and that some 
students involved in the latter two instances met with a member of the BART team. 
Id. No other disciplinary measures were listed in the Annual Report samples.  
75 Id. 
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disciplinary process, nor are they investigated by police from a BART 
referral.76 This enforces and upholds the University’s goal to provide a 
platform for meaningful discussion and educational opportunities 
rather than punish students for content-based speech.77 
Additionally, Speech First, Inc. challenged another policy named 
as No Contact Directives (“NCDs”).78 The University’s Student 
Disciplinary Procedures explained that disciplinary officers from the 
university may direct an individual student who is subject to student 
discipline to have no contact with one or more persons with an NCD.79 
There is no physical distance requirement that students under NCDs 
must avoid each other, but any form of communication with the sole 
purpose of provoking or intimidating discourse between the students is 
highly discouraged.80 There is only a recommendation of the 
punishment of dismissal from the University if a student violates an 
NCD he or she has with another student.81  
However, again, the University detailed that it only imposes 
NCDs in response to violations of the student code to prevent potential 
violations, and that no student has ever been subject to NCDs for 
expression alone.82 There is no formal punishment given to students 
who choose to not follow the NCD, and outside of the provocation or 
intimidation contexts, students under NCDs may interact and 
communicate with each other.83 The only instance of an NCD 
mentioned in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion stemmed from two 
students after one attended an anti-Trump rally and attacked students 
in attendance.84 The second student subsequently wrote a student 
 
76 Id. at 634. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 635-36. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 636. 
82 Id. at 635-36. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 636. 
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newspaper article about the entire incident.85 The official NCD 
suggested that the second student not write about the first student, but 
the students were both aware that this was not a disciplinary charge, 
just a recommendation.86 Further, the second student was still 
permitted to write journalistic stories about the first student.87 The 
students were encouraged to create physical spaces in their 
interactions, but the two students’ speech was not restricted. It was 
only provoking or intimidating contact between the two that was 
discouraged by the University. 
The last policy that Speech First, Inc. cited at the University of 
Illinois for chilling speech was Student Code § 2-407, which 
prohibited students from “posting and distributing leaflets, handbills, 
and other types of materials” about candidates for non-campus 
elections without prior approval.88 Students who ignored this section 
of the student code did face disciplinary action, including reprimand, 
censure, probation, suspension, and dismissal from the University.89 
However, the record before the Seventh Circuit lacked any evidence 
that the University did, in fact, enforce this section of the student 
code.90  
Soon after the initiation of Speech First’s case against Killeen and 
other defendants, Student Code § 2-407 was repealed.91 The Associate 
Dean of Students issued a University-sanctioned statement clarifying 
that the University had no intention of restoring this eliminated 
provision.92 Further, the repeal took immediate effect without delay by 





88 Id. at 636-37.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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student code by repealing this certain provision by students, faculty, 
and administrators sitting on the Urbana-Champaign Senate.  
On appeal, Speech First, Inc. only argued that the District Court 
for the Central District of Illinois erred when it found that Speech 
First, Inc. did not allege an injury in fact under the standing doctrine 
analysis.94 Under current standing doctrine jurisprudence,  the 
“chilled” speech that Speech First intended to demonstrate, that the 
University prevented students from engaging in, was not a sufficient 
injury. Therefore, Speech First, Inc. could not be the most appropriate 
and best suited party for this particular lawsuit. 
 
Comparing and Contrasting with Other Circuits 
 
In analyzing BART and BIP, the Seventh Circuit found that there 
was no alleged injury for a few significant reasons. First, it agreed 
with the district court that “[b]ias-motivated speech alone is not a 
Student Code violation,” as any disciplinary process attached to BART 
or BIP does not apply to students whose views expression was 
supposedly chilled or limited under these policies.95 Speech First, Inc. 
does not dispute this finding from the district court.96 Therefore, this 
first reason shows that its members did not “face a credible threat of 
enforcement” by the University for more conservative, expressed 
views.97 
Second, the Seventh Circuit compared this case to Abbott v. 
Pastides, 900 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2018). The main similarity between 
these cases is that the students in Killeen were unable to make with 
clarity and specificity the speech they would have preferred to 
express.98 Therefore, it was unlikely that the students would have been 
 
94 Id. at 637-38. 
95 Id. at 639.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 640. The Seventh Circuit noted that Abbott v. Pastides, 900 F.3d 160 
(4th Cir. 2018), was instructive to its Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen analysis, as it 
demonstrated a mandatory, compulsory event rather than a voluntary, optional one 
that had a weighted, implied threat of chilled speech, in part silenced by the 
18
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reported to either BART or BIP. In Abbott, students received official 
letters instructing them to attend a mandatory meeting with the 
University of South Carolina officials after the students hosted a “Free 
Speech” event.99 The Fourth Circuit found that the Abbott plaintiffs 
failed to identify any speech event they planned or desired to sponsor 
at this event.100 Therefore, the Abbott plaintiffs missed illustrating how 
the defendants deterred “some specific intended act of expression 
protected by the First Amendment.”101 Without any specific 
statements of what particular speech students wished to engage in, it is 
difficult to imagine any sort of injury in fact, as a claimed First 
Amendment right to expression was not blocked or chilled by a 
university policy which aims to protect students against bias-motivated 
or racist speech.102 Claimed lack of expression alone does not 
constitute any recognizable injury in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion for 
Article III standing for an alleged First Amendment violation.103 
Since most conversations with BART were optional and in no 
way mandatory for students, the district court finding that the lack of 
any discipline by BART or BIP with identified students also resulted 
in no harm or injury to the student.104 The Seventh Circuit 
distinguished this finding and reasoning from Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
 
University of South Carolina. While the University of South Carolina’s goals were 
the same at the University of Illinois’s in attempting to prevent incidences of biased 
and racist speech, among other things, the execution of this goal ultimately is what 
differed between the two higher education institutions. Yet, the articulation of what 
speech was exactly “chilled speech” by the two universities led the Seventh Circuit 
to its ultimate conclusion. 
99 Abbott, 900 F.3d at 163. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 171. 
102 Id.  
103 Again, this brings to prominence the formalized, tripartite Article III 
standing scheme that federal courts must utilize. Otherwise, plaintiffs could 
potentially bring frivolous lawsuits that are not redressable, nor would it be equitable 
for a court to potentially admonish the defendant if the plaintiff cannot allege a 
sufficient injury. 
104 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 640. 
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Sullivan.105 In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island Commission to 
Encourage Morality in Youth notified a publication distributor dozens 
of times, stating that certain publications were inappropriate for sales 
to children.106 The complaints were followed up with police 
visitations.107 The Supreme Court found that these complaints were 
“virtually . . . orders” that were disguised and could be explained as 
“thinly veiled threats.”108 Here, though, since the students’ 
involvement was optional and no threats were made for 
noncompliance following a BART or BP incident report, there were 
“essentially no consequences.”109 
Since the University’s policies essentially held no consequences 
for students, the Seventh Circuit held fast to the traditional 
understanding of the standing doctrine, contemplating actual injury in 
fact, rather than a far-flung alleged injury that had a small chance of 
occurring in the future. In a further comparison with Abbott, the 
Seventh Circuit also explained that the Abbott mandatory meeting with 
administrative officials at the University of South Carolina, again, 
distinguishes itself from the voluntary nature of BART and BIP at the 
University of Illinois.110 Plainly put by the Fourth Circuit in Abbott, 
 
[A] threatened administrative inquiry will not be treated as an 
ongoing First Amendment inquiry sufficient to confer 
standing unless the administrative process itself imposes 
some significant burden. . . . Even an objectively reasonable 
“threat” that the plaintiffs might someday have to meet briefly 
with a University official in a non-adversarial format, to 
provide their own version of events in response to student 
complaints, cannot be characterized as the equivalent of a 
credible threat of “enforcement” or as the kind of 
 
105 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
106 Id. at 59-61. 
107 Id. at 68. 
108 Id. 
109 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 640-41. 
110 Id. at 641; Abbott, 900 F.3d at 171. 
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“extraordinarily intrusive” process that might make 
censorship and objectively reasonable response. 
 
Id. at 179 (emphasis added). Therefore, an optional meeting at the 
University of Illinois cannot allege a sufficient injury in fact where a 
mandatory one at the University of South Carolina does not. An 
optional meeting at the University of Illinois would allow all students 
involved an opportunity to share their stories, rather than acting as a 
disciplinary measure. Again, the goal to provide a safe platform to 
discuss and resolve incidents of biased-motivated speech with no 
coercion to participate allows for learning, rather than condemnation 
for reported students.111 
The last argument that Speech First, Inc. claimed attempted to 
compare the alleged First Amendment violation here with 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart.112 It claimed that the University of 
Illinois “can chill speech without threatening an investigation or 
prosecution, and even without authority to take any official action.’”113 
However, the threat of an investigation in Backpage.com issued from 
Sheriff Dart to prevent sex trafficking was sent on official letterhead 
that demanded action, and also condemned the plaintiff’s activities and 
reminded them of their potential liability.114 Again, the Seventh 
Circuit readily distinguished Sheriff Dart’s letter from the University’s 
administrators ask for students to attend a voluntary meeting.115 The 
nature of Sheriff Dart’s letter, with the impact it had on official 
letterhead and reminder of potential liability, acted as a more coercive 
tool in obtaining the plaintiffs’ compliance, as opposed to a requested, 
but optional, meeting between a university administrator and 
 
111 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 641. 
112 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015). 
113 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 641-42 (quoting Backpage.com, LLC, 807 
F.3d at 236). 
114 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 642 (describing Backpage.com, LLC, 807 
F.3d at 236). 
115 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 642. 
21
Goers: Standing On One Leg: Balancing College Students' Free Speech with
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 16                                          Fall 2020 
 
22 
students.116 The Seventh Circuit stated that “when the majority of 
students BART contacts decline a meeting, Speech First’s speculation 
that BART’s outreach carries an implicit threat of consequences lacks 
merit.”117  
Regarding NCDs, there was an insufficient injury in fact, as no 
protected speech was prevented from the NCDs themselves. The 
NCDs acted as a protective tool to prevent incidences of racism and 
bias between students.118 It was not intended to chill speech, just its 
direction in situations where the speech could be found volatile and 
negatively impact students.119 The University of Illinois still 
encourages students to engage in intellectual inquiry and discourse, 
even with the NCDs in place.120 And, again, Speech First failed to 
demonstrate any evidence that showed how students feared from 
expressing a particular viewpoint with the supposed threat of an NCD 
being issued to them.121 The argued self-censorship that Speech First, 
Inc. alleges with NCDs could not be found in the current findings 
before the Seventh Circuit.122  
The Seventh Circuit did not spend a lot of its resources discussing 
the doctrine of mootness for Student Code § 2-407.123 Student Code § 
2-407 was a “prior approval” rule that “prohibited students from 
post[ing] and distributing leaflets, handbills, and other types of 
materials about candidates for non-campus elections without” consent 
from the University.124 While a party’s actions may render a case or 




118 Id. at 633. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 644. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 645-46. 
124 Id. at 636. 
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controversy exists.125 Rather, there must be some sort of affirmative 
action by the party to illustrate that it will not slip back into its old 
ways or habits.126 The swift repeal of the student code provision by the 
University Senate may seem suspicious to some, but it did not raise 
any alarms with the Seventh Circuit. Namely, the University 
contended and demonstrated that it does not intend to reinstate the 
challenged provision, nor does it want to amend a new one in its place 
into the student code.127  
Judge Brennan was the only judge on the panel to dissent 
regarding the issue of mootness of repealed Student Code § 2-407. He 
agreed with the other judge’s in that BART, BIP, and NCDs did not 
reveal any injury in fact to sustain standing in this case, but the student 
code provision was not denounced with the standards of “heavy 
burden” and absolute clearness that attaches to a doctrine of mootness 
question in school and education cases.128 To Judge Brennan, the swift 
repeal of the student code provision shortly after the case started its 
litigation life cycle was suspicious.129 The firm denouncement was not 
firm enough, according to other education and school district cases 
 
125 Id.; see Fed'n of Advert. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago 
("Federation"), 326 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that where a policy’s 
repeal is not genuine, then a court may refuse to find that the case is moot); see also 
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33, 73 S. Ct. 894, 97 L. Ed. 
1303 (1953) (stating that “a defendant's voluntary cessation of challenged conduct 
will not render a case moot because the defendant remains 'free to return to his old 
ways.’”). A case only becomes moot if it is “absolutely clear that the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).  
126 W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632-33. 
127 First Speech, Inc., 968 F.3d at 646. 
128 Id. at 653-54; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189. If there was no 
absolute clearness of a defendant’s willingness to not return to his old ways, 
voluntary compliance could merely be demonstrative and persuade a court to dismiss 
the case. Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 
393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). A defendant’s voluntary compliance of dismissing or 
repealing a policy without a firm adherence to condemning it does not render a case 
moot. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189. 
129 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 653.  
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involving the same issue of mootness. He reasoned that the University 
of Illinois’s failure “to document in any way its decision to make the 
change permanent” would be sufficient to present a live controversy 
that is not already moot.130  
A further reconciliation between the heavy burden and mootness 
doctrine that Judge Brennan analyzes would also require or expect the 
University to adopt a “forward-looking, binding, and formal policy 
position” against the past student code provision as evidence of not 
returning to its old ways.131 A simple declaration of repealing the 
student code provision with an announcement of an intention to not 
instill it again in a disguised form was not sufficient to maintain the 
issue as moot, according to Judge Brennan.132  
While Judge Brennan differs from his colleagues in the Seventh 
Circuit regarding the doctrine of mootness, the University’s 
denouncement and repeal must be taken in good faith.133 Therefore, 
while the burden that the majority and Judge Brennan used in their 
analyses differs, the repeal of the student code provision announces 
the same result. It is important to note that while the standing doctrine 
and mootness doctrine application here seems to revert to the old, 
formalistic scheme derived from Article III, the Seventh Circuit 
correctly applied caselaw to Speech First, Inc.’s complaint against the 
University of Illinois. There was no realized injury in fact. The only 
issue of “chilled” speech resulted from students’ unrealized fear, not 
from actual instances in which protected speech was extinguished by 
the University.134 The free speech crisis and supposed free intellectual 
inquiry dearth on college campuses does not present itself here, as the 
 
130 Id.; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Comm. Sch., 885 F.3d 
1038, 1052 (7th Cir. 2018). 
131 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 656. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 646 (stating that the “University is a public entity and an arm of the 
state government of Illinois, and therefore receives the presumption that it acts in 
good faith.”). 
134 Id. at 633. The parties do not dispute that, “if its members were to have 
standing, Speech First would have associational standing,” however, Speech First 
only contested the injury in fact portion of the tripartite standing test. Id. at 638. 
24
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University of Illinois was only creating a platform for understanding 
during speech and debate; not a complete barrier of accessing other 
students’ varied opinions.135 
 
A Close Call – How Schlissel and Killeen Differ, Even with Nearly 
Identical Facts 
 
The Seventh Circuit deviated and distinguished Killeen from its 
cousin in the Sixth Circuit, Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel.136 In a 
nearly identical case featuring students at the University of Michigan, 
the Sixth Circuit held that the university students had standing.137 The 
University of Michigan’s policies for encouraging a safe, 
accommodating space for students to voice their opinions on a neutral 
platform, while also monitoring for harassing language, were 
actionable under the standing doctrine.138 
The Sixth Circuit differed from the Seventh Circuit, finding that 
the students had standing, as the injury in fact was not as far flung and 
more realized than the students at the University of Illinois.139 The 
Sixth Circuit also granted Speech First, Inc. associational standing, 
rather than denying it altogether.140 While the policies between the two 
universities accomplish the same goals, the Sixth Circuit found that 
the University of Michigan’s policies does, in fact, have an injury in 
fact, where students demonstrated that their opinions and speech were 
“chilled” due to potential punishment by the university.141 The Sixth 
Circuit stated that the policy similar to the University of Illinois’s 
BART protocol and program that it “subjects students to processes 
 
135 Id. at 633; Bollinger, supra. 
136 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019). 
137 Id. at 770-71. An important point to note is that Speech First, Inc. was given 
associational standing in Schlissel. Id. at 765. Both students have an  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 765-66. 
140 Id. 
141 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 643; Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 
at 764-65. 
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which could lead to . . . punishments,” and had the potential to also 
lead to “consequences that [the student] would otherwise not face.”142  
In comparison to the University of Illinois’s BART policy and 
protocol, Speech First did not allege any viable and valuable evidence 
that a student’s failure to respond to an instance of outreach or accept 
a meeting with the BART team.143 Additionally, the invitation to 
attend a BART meeting or outreach instance similarly did not feel like 
an “implicit threat” to students.144 The University of Illinois’s students 
virtually faced no repercussions for not attending or acknowledging a 
BART meeting, nor could Speech First, Inc., for the university 
students, demonstrate that the threats carried weight, and therefore, not 
empty.145 The Seventh Circuit further pointed out the since the 
“majority of students decline to meet [this] signals that students do not 
fear consequences from the refusal to participate.”146  
When also discussing the practicalities and realities of these two 
programs, there are notable differences for the effect that each 
university’s policy had on students. The University of Michigan 
students were able to allege that speech was ‘chilled” and that threats 
or noncompliance in attending a meeting or adhere to the program did 
carry weight and could carry some sort of punishment, even though it 
was minimal.147 The University of Illinois students, while it had the 
Sixth Circuit’s Schlissel decision as a persuasive example, failed to 
illustrate the impact that the BART policy had on them. Speech First 
also had no firsthand knowledge of the BART policy and protocol, 
therefore, the information obtained in this lawsuit against the 
university was akin to secondhand knowledge.148 By refusing to give 
Speech First associational standing here in Killeen, the Seventh Circuit 
logically parted ways with the Sixth Circuit and demonstrated the 
 
142 Id. at 765. 
143 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 643-44. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 640. 
147 Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 756. 
148 Speech First, Inc., 968 F. 3d at 634. 
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effectiveness of properly alleging injury in fact for standing doctrine 
questions and cases.  
A second comparison and parallel between Schlissel and Killeen 
also happened regarding the issue of mootness for each of these 
cases.149 Both the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits analyzed both of 
these issues through the standing and mootness doctrine to produce 
justiciable and viable outcomes for all parties involved. The standing 
doctrine, while arguably a brick wall for some lawsuits, rationally and 
logically selects cases that result in actual issues reaching resolutions, 
instead of intangible results for unrealized problems. The mootness 
doctrine also similarly functions in this way. It selects and carves out 
instances in which it would be the most appropriate time for a court to 
decide a lawsuit.  
In adhering to the mootness principle, the Seventh Circuit created 
an additional rule regarding the ripeness or correct timing of cases. In 
Killeen, the student code section found to be the source of mootness in 
the case was repealed seven weeks into the start of litigation.150 While 
Judge Brennan stated that this was suspicious in his own dissent from 
the panel, the Seventh Circuit found that the repeal of the student code 
section did not warrant review by the court.151   
This Seventh Circuit decision continues to close the door for First 
Amendment issues by way of carefully construing parties who are 
most appropriate to bring a grievance in to court. This narrowing does 
not take away First Amendment freedoms, rather it supposes a correct 





149 In Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 936 F.3d at 646, the majority held that the 
Student Code provision was moot. In Speech First, Inc., v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d at 
770, the University of Michigan did not put forth enough affirmative action for the 
Sixth Circuit to find the case not moot. Even with using the same blackletter law, the 
Sixth Circuit instructed a rigid analysis of what constitutes as genuine and 
affirmative regarding the repeal of a policy as to render a case moot.  
150 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 633. 
151 Id. at 654-55. 
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The Seventh Circuit held true to the tripartite scheme from the 
1970s that developed into a carefully crafted and nuanced test 
regarding a party’s standing. The Seventh Circuit did not condemn 
Speech First, Inc. for choosing to file this case as an association.152 It 
held that Speech First, Inc. did not demonstrate an injury in fact, a 
legally recognized cause of action, when disapproving of the 
University’s policies.153 Therefore, this case does not expect future 
litigants to always have an individual party as a plaintiff, but asks that 
litigants have a more traditionally recognized and sound injury when 
filing a case in federal court.154  
In further detailing and explaining that the injury was not “in fact” 
as required by traditional standing doctrine jurisprudence, the Seventh 
Circuit correctly held that there was no “credible threat” felt by 
students about content-based regulation or coerced self-censorship 
from BART, BIP, or the NCDs.155 When students’ speech had no 
formal or University-recognized enforcement that required the 
students to change their opinions or stop their speech altogether, this is 
not indicative of any “chilling” or censorship. Rather, the policies, 
based on University statistics serve as a processional tool in allowing 
students to bridge ideological gaps through a valid learning 
opportunity and optional conversation.156 The Seventh Circuit was 
correct in finding that a completely optional ability to participate in a 
learning experience cannot be a realized injury, nor can it be a 
hypothesized injury.157  
In returning to other associations or organization that have 
attempted to file suit on behalf of its members in the Seventh Circuit, 
 
152 Id. at 638 (clarifying that associational standing would readily apply to 
Speech First “if its members were to have standing, Speech First would have 
associational standing,” and that no party contests this on appeal). 
153 Id. at 633. 
154 Lee, supra note 14, at 178-79 (commenting on how “injury in fact” must 
be realized and not hypothesized). 
155 Speech First, Inc., 968 F.3d at 644, 647. 
156 Id. at 632. 
157 Id. at 634. 
28
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol16/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 16                                          Fall 2020 
 
29 
those claims have been dismissed for reasons other than standing. Two 
COVID-19 cases filed during mid-2020 illustrate that the Seventh 
Circuit will still find that associational standing is valid and will 
continue to bypass cases that cannot satisfy all three elements of the 
tripartite scheme of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. First, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the Northern District of Illinois correctly 
denied two church’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that sought an injunction to 
Governor J.B. Pritzker’s Executive Order 2020-32.158 The Executive 
Order prohibited “[a]ll public and private gatherings of any number of 
people occurring outside a single household or living unit” except for 
essential purposes.159 The Seventh Circuit focused its analysis on the 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, where the churches alleged discrimination of 
their religion in violation of the First Amendment because of the size 
restriction of gatherings and general condemnation of large gathering 
that the churches would have.160 The Seventh Circuit found no need 
for a standing analysis, nor did it find that the church did not have 
standing to file a claim on behalf of its members, therefore, 
demonstrating that associational standing is valid in the circuit. 
Second, when the Illinois Republican Party filed a First 
Amendment claim against Governor Pritzker, the Seventh Circuit was, 
again, willing to overlook the standing analysis that it gave to Speech 
First, Inc.161 The Illinois Republican Party alleged that the religious 
carve-out exception in Executive Order 43 violated the Party’s right to 
free speech under the First Amendment, as Governor Pritzker only 
exempted religious activities from Executive Order 43.162 It focused 
on the merits of the complaint against the Governor’s Executive Order 
and alleged disparate treatment of religious groups and political 
 
158 Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 
2020). 
159 Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-38 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/ 
Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-32.aspx. 
160 Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 342. 
161 Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2020). 
162 Id. at 761-62. 
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groups.163 The Seventh Circuit held that a preliminary injunction 
against the Executive Order was unwarranted, as Governor Pritzker 
could exempt or allow for religious activities under Executive Order 
43 while declining to do the same for other types of activities.164 The 
Seventh Circuit’s willingness to analyze the case’s merits continues to 
demonstrate that associational standing, if pled correctly by a plaintiff, 
will allow for a case and controversy in the circuit.  
Returning to the standing and doctrine question analyzed in 
Speech First, Inc., the Seventh Circuit further developed the standing 
doctrine and the mootness doctrine. The adherence to the tripartite 
scheme and its many nuances in determining what a credible threat or 
injury in fact entails creates room for courts to explore and outline 
instances in which a particularized injury in fact is realized, and 
therefore, creates standing for a plaintiff’s case or controversy.  
The Seventh Circuit further analyzed the meaning of “injury in 
fact” for its circuit, not wanting to overreach politically or legislatively 
into other branches of the federal government.165 Additionally, by 
finding Speech First’s complaint as moot, it prevented an advisory 
decision that would be in opposition to courts’ main function of 
resolving “live” disputes between parties so that any redress has an 
immediate impact, rather than one in theory.166 Speech First, Inc. v. 
Killeen will not be the last case of its kind, as the issue of students’ 
First Amendment rights at college will continue to progress and 
permeate through other campuses. However, the Seventh Circuit, 
similar to Abbott and Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, created another 
instructive decision that courts around the country may rely upon in 
analyzing whether a policy does allege a particularized, realized injury 
in fact worthy of standing. 
 
163 Id. at 763-64. The Seventh Circuit also addressed mootness in Elim 
Romanian Pentecostal Church, 962 F.3d at 344-45, and Illinois Republican Party, 
973 F.3d at 763, where it found that the case was not moot if the Executive Orders at 
issue in either case changed, since Governor Pritzker committed himself to possible 
reinstatement of the Executive Orders dependent upon the state of the pandemic. 
164 Id. at 764. 
165 See Elliot, supra note 14, at 557. 
166 Scott, supra note 39, at 773 (quoting Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91). 
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The standing doctrine is a necessary prerequisite to address 
legitimate concerns in federal courts. The Seventh Circuit 
demonstrated the need for students themselves to bring claims of First 
Amendment violations where there is actual injury and fear of a 
chilling effect on speech. Merely proposing that a higher education 
institution’s policies detract from students’ right to free inquiry and 
meaningful speech and debate on a college campus does not help fix 
the supposed free speech crisis currently happening across the country. 
In order to find a more equitable solution to balancing a party’s rights 
and grievances, it is best to adhere to Article III’s longstanding 
tradition of requiring a proper party to bring a claim. 
Further, mootness of certain student codes and the idea that the 
alleged grievance should still be addressable by the time a court 
decides the issue is also of utmost importance. The flexibility in the 
doctrine of mootness allows for the door to a case or controversy to 
remain slightly propped open in the Seventh Circuit for plaintiffs that 
lack standing in the traditional sense with the tripartite scheme. 
However, the doctrine of mootness is still useful in apportioning when 
a case or controversy is most appropriately brought before a court. 
Therefore, from one of its newest cases, the Seventh Circuit has 
created a further understanding of the standing doctrine. Even though 
this doctrine has long been criticized, it supports the efficiency of the 
court system in saving the court’s time and parties’ money. The only 
issue now is whether an independent free speech organization will 
ever be able to establish an injury in a tangible way that the Seventh 
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